Chapter

Three Epistemic Principles: Discrimination, Evidential Transmission, and Favouring

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemological Disjunctivism

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199557912
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191743290 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0012
Three Epistemic Principles: Discrimination, Evidential Transmission, and Favouring

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This chapter suggests that if we wish to retain the closure principle, then there is a burden upon us to explain what this knowledge of the entailed proposition is in virtue of, and that means that we both need to account for the failure of the discrimination principle whilst also responding to this evidential challenge posed by the evidential transmission and favouring principles. The key to resolving both these problems is to recognize that Zula's evidential position is in fact much stronger than we ordinarily tend to think, and certainly strong enough to satisfy the requirements laid down by the evidential transmission and favouring principles.

Keywords: closure principle; discrimination principle; favouring principles; evidential transmission; Zula

Chapter.  1724 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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