Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemological Disjunctivism

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199557912
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191743290 | DOI:

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This chapter considers the question of why the distinction between favouring and discriminating epistemic support has not been widely recognized. One explanation is that that when we think about the zebra case we tend to naturally describe Zula's knowledge as knowledge that is gained ‘just by looking’. In doing so, we have a tendency to ignore the background knowledge that can be relevant to the evidential support that an agent has for her perceptual knowledge, even in cases where the belief formed is fairly mundane. Another reason why commentators have tended to overlook this distinction between favouring and discriminating epistemic support is that, at least typically, when one explicitly claims to (perceptually) know a proposition one thereby represents oneself as possessing discriminating evidence in support of that claim rather than just favouring evidence.

Keywords: epistemic support; favouring; discriminating; Zula; zebra case

Chapter.  1782 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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