Chapter

Radical Scepticism

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemological Disjunctivism

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199557912
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191743290 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0018
Radical Scepticism

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This chapter sets out a radical sceptical argument: (S1) I am unable to know the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses. (S2) If I am unable to know the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses, then I am unable to possess much of the everyday knowledge which I typically attribute to myself. (SC) I am unable to possess much of the everyday knowledge which I typically attribute to myself. The motivation for (S1) is meant to come from reflecting on the nature of radical sceptical hypotheses. The motivation for (S2) is meant to come from the highly plausible closure principle. And since (S1) and (S2) entail (SC), we have thus motivated radical scepticism.

Keywords: radical sceptical argument; radical scepticism; everyday knowledge

Chapter.  1244 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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