Chapter

Contemporary Neo-Mooreanism

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemological Disjunctivism

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199557912
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191743290 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0020
Contemporary Neo-Mooreanism

Show Summary Details

Preview

This chapter focuses on neo-Moorean views, positions which mirror the Moorean anti-sceptical view while differing on crucial details. Like Mooreanism, neo-Mooreanism confronts the radical sceptical problem head-on by allowing that we can know the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses. Accordingly, again like Mooreanism, the view avoids radical scepticism while retaining the closure principle by denying the first premise in the radical sceptic's argument, (S1). Furthermore, neo-Mooreanism achieves this in a Moorean spirit by avoiding, as much as possible, epistemological revisionism. Unlike Mooreanism, however, neo-Moorean views aim to offer the wider theoretical motivation for the proposal, thereby avoiding the kinds of problems facing Mooreanism just outlined. In this sense they are theoretical rather than pre-theoretical responses to the radical sceptical problem.

Keywords: neo-Moorean; anti-sceptical view; radical scepticism; epistemological revisionism

Chapter.  2327 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.