Motivating Epistemological Disjunctivist Neo-Mooreanism

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemological Disjunctivism

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199557912
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191743290 | DOI:
Motivating Epistemological Disjunctivist Neo-Mooreanism

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This chapter argues that what is missing from the simpleminded version of epistemological disjunctivist neo-Mooreanism is an account of why the extent to which one needs to cite an independent rational basis in order to dismiss an error-possibility can be dependent on whether the error-possibility has been epistemically motivated. In cases — whether sceptical or non-sceptical — where an agent has factive rational support available to her, she needs an independent rational basis to dismiss the target error-possibility (which is inconsistent with this rational basis) only where that error-possibility has been epistemically motivated. However, that radical sceptical error-possibilities are in their nature lacking in epistemic motivation. The net result is that epistemological disjunctivists are able to appeal to the factive reflectively accessible that is available to them in the good+ case in order to motivate a form of neo-Mooreanism after all, so long as they supply this additional account of why independent grounds for dismissing the target error-possibility are not required in this case.

Keywords: epistemological disjunctivesm; neo-Mooreanism; radical scepticism; factive rational support

Chapter.  2525 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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