Overriding versus Undercutting Anti-Sceptical Strategies

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemological Disjunctivism

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199557912
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191743290 | DOI:
Overriding versus Undercutting Anti-Sceptical Strategies

Show Summary Details


This chapter presents the radical sceptical paradox, at least insofar as it made use of the BIV sceptical hypothesis: BIV-Based Radical Scepticism qua Paradox — (BIV1) I don't know that I'm not a BIV. (BIV2) If I know that I have two hands, then I know that I'm not a BIV. (BIV3) I do know that I have two hands. It is shown that epistemological disjunctivist neo-Mooreanism represents an undercutting anti-sceptical strategy, and as such it is in a position to offer an intellectually satisfying response to the radical sceptical paradox. Indeed, if the epistemological disjunctivist is right that this putative paradox is actually at root motivated by faulty philosophical theory rather than by intuition, then the net effect of this anti-sceptical strategy is that radical scepticism is not the paradox that it claims to be. As such, this anti-sceptical proposal is much better placed to deal with the sceptical problem than its epistemic externalist neo-Moorean rival, who is committed to offering a dialectically weaker overriding anti-sceptical strategy.

Keywords: radical sceptical paradox; intuitive claim; anti-sceptical proposals; epistemological disjunctivism; neo-Mooreanism

Chapter.  2005 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.