Chapter

Knowing and Saying That One Knows

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemological Disjunctivism

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199557912
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191743290 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0025
Knowing and Saying That One Knows

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What would prompt an agent to move from the logically weaker nonexplicit knowledge claim (i.e., ‘It's a zebra’) to the corresponding explicit knowledge claim (i.e., ‘I know that it's a zebra’)? Perhaps the most obvious motivation for making an explicit knowledge claim is to respond to a particular challenge that has been raised regarding one's initial assertion. Since our interest in explicit knowledge claims is precisely in the conditions that govern their propriety in conversational contexts where challenges have been raised (e.g., sceptical challenges), this chapter focuses on this particular motivation for explicit knowledge claims. It concentrates only with those cases where the initial assertion is specifically concerned with a proposition which the agent believes via perception.

Keywords: explicit knowledge claims; conversational context; perception; zebra

Chapter.  3964 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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