Chapter

The Justificatory Liberalism of Gerald Gaus

Nicholas Wolterstorff and Terence Cuneo

in Understanding Liberal Democracy

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199558957
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191744808 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199558957.003.0004
The Justificatory Liberalism of Gerald Gaus

Show Summary Details

Preview

Gerald Gaus has developed a distinct version of public reason liberalism and has done so with a great deal of philosophical sophistication. There are two respects in which Gaus’ version of public reason liberalism is significantly distinct. He develops and employs the moral demand argument far more carefully and thoroughly than any other public reason liberal does. And whereas most versions of public reason liberalism are consensus theories, his is a convergence theory. This chapter examines Gaus' view in detail, explores the main arguments Gaus offers for it, and concludes that Gaus' position is unsatisfactory.

Keywords: argument from respect; closed justification; convergence; Eberle; Christopher; justificatory liberalism; idealization; moral demand argument; open justification; public reason liberalism

Chapter.  10181 words. 

Subjects: Social and Political Philosophy

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.