Chapter

Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical

Michael E. Bratman

in Spheres of Reason

Published in print October 2009 | ISBN: 9780199572939
Published online February 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191722165 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572939.003.0002

Series: Mind Association Occasional Series

Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical

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The planning theory of intention highlights rational demands for consistency and coherence of intentions. But how should we understand these rational demands? According to ‘cognitivism’ these rational demands are grounded, by way of the involvement of belief in intention, in rational demands for consistency and coherence of belief. This chapter explores a range of problems that arise for different versions of such cognitivism. It argues that cognitivism is problematic, and that it is more plausible to see these norms of consistency and coherence of intention as fundamentally practical norms that are part and parcel of a planning system that is so important to our lives.

Keywords: belief; cognitivism; coherence; consistency; intention; planning theory

Chapter.  15792 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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