Chapter

Reasons and Rationality

Jonathan Dancy

in Spheres of Reason

Published in print October 2009 | ISBN: 9780199572939
Published online February 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191722165 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572939.003.0004

Series: Mind Association Occasional Series

Reasons and Rationality

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Joseph Raz holds that the normativity of everything that is normative consists in some relation to reasons. Testing the view that reasons are normatively basic, this chapter considers whether there may not be some things which we ought to do but which we have no reason to do. Crucially, do we have some reason to do each of the things that we are rationally required to do? The chapter approaches this issue by thinking about the rather different rational requirement that we do what, if things were as we believe them to be, we would have most reason to do. Do we have any reason to do this? If not, does our doing it exhibit some virtue?

Keywords: normativity; ought; Joseph Raz; rational; reasons; requirement; virtue

Chapter.  10313 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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