Chapter

Assertion and Isolated Second‐Hand Knowledge*

Jennifer Lackey

in Assertion

Published in print January 2011 | ISBN: 9780199573004
Published online May 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191595127 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.003.0011
Assertion and Isolated Second‐Hand Knowledge*

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A common view in the recent philosophical literature is that knowledge is sufficient for proper assertion. More precisely, it is frequently said that one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows that p. This chapter argues that this thesis is false. In particular, it is shown that there are various kinds of cases in which a speaker asserts that p, clearly knows that p, and yet does not have the proper epistemic authority or credentials to make such an assertion, thereby showing that knowledge is not always sufficient for epistemically proper assertion. A diagnosis is then offered of what is salient in the cases challenging this sufficiency claim and a broad feature is highlighted that needs to be accounted for in any view of the norm governing proper assertion.

Keywords: assertion; knowledge; second-hand knowledge; sufficiency; quantity of epistemic support; epistemic authority

Chapter.  12837 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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