Chapter

Some Sellarsian Myths

Paul Snowdon

in Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism

Published in print November 2009 | ISBN: 9780199573301
Published online February 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191722172 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573301.003.0005

Series: Mind Association Occasional Series

Some Sellarsian Myths

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This chapter locates Sellars's discussion of perception in ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ within the context of his discussion of the myth of the given. It argues that his criticisms of the traditional sense datum theory are insightful but in some respects indecisive. It is further argued that Sellars's account of our thought about perception contains important insights in his treatment of looks-judgments, but that he mis-describes in a fundamental way our understanding of such talk, and that more mistakes creep into his account when he links our thought about perception to the second myth of Jones.

Keywords: perception; sense datum; looks-judgments; myth of Jones; Wilfrid Sellars

Chapter.  11065 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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