Chapter

The Case of Germany: From Blockholding to Hybrid Corporate Governance Regime

Roger M. Barker

in Corporate Governance, Competition, and Political Parties

Published in print January 2010 | ISBN: 9780199576814
Published online May 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191722509 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199576814.003.0009
The Case of Germany: From Blockholding to Hybrid Corporate Governance Regime

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A declining level of support for the status quo blockholder model of corporate governance emerged among German insider labor and Left party actors during the late 1990s. At the same time, the private universal banks withdrew from their postwar role as guardians of the German corporate network. The reduced willingness of blockholders to compromise with insider labor in the operation of firms – due to the reduced availability of economic rents – made it possible for SPD party modernizers to win support for pro‐shareholder reform that redistributed power from blockholders to outsider capital.

Keywords: Germany; case study; SPD; insider labor; German universal banks

Chapter.  13489 words. 

Subjects: International Business

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