Alan H. Goldman

in Reasons from Within

Published in print November 2009 | ISBN: 9780199576906
Published online February 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191722288 | DOI:

Show Summary Details


This chapter briefly summarizes arguments and conclusions from previous chapters. Externalism faces unanswerable questions about how our concerns connect to objective values, how we know about such values, why they inhere in the objects we find valuable, and how they could be relevant to us if unconnected to our concerns. Internalism can explain normativity, ultimately in terms of the natural aims of belief and action. It is the simpler and more unified theory, both metaphysically and epistemologically. It is to be preferred on grounds of these theoretical virtues, and is no worse on phenomenological grounds. Objective values would provide external justification for our concerns, much as God does for religious believers; both are equally mythical.

Keywords: internalism; externalism; theoretical virtues

Chapter.  2416 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.