Chapter

Values and Emotions

Christine Tappolet

in Morality and the Emotions

Published in print October 2011 | ISBN: 9780199577507
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191731235 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577507.003.0006
Values and Emotions

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Neo-sentimentalism is the view that to judge that something has an evaluative property is to judge that some affective or emotional attitude is appropriate, or fitting, with respect to it. Such a fitting-attitudes analysis allows for different versions. With the aim to spell out the most plausible version, the chapter distinguishes between a normative version, which takes the concept of appropriateness to be normative, and a descriptive version, which claims that appropriateness in emotions is a matter of correspondence to evaluative facts. It argues that both versions satisfy the normativity requirement that follows from Moore’s open question argument. However, the descriptive version is superior to the normative one with respect to the explanatory role of values and to the ‘wrong kind of reason objection’. The chapter ends with a discussion of circularity threats.

Keywords: emotions; fitting-attitude analysis; Moore’s open question argument; Neo-Sentimentalism; values; wrong kind of reason objection

Chapter.  9453 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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