Chapter

The Political Economy of the SDRM

Brad Setser

in Overcoming Developing Country Debt Crises

Published in print February 2010 | ISBN: 9780199578788
Published online May 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191723049 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199578788.003.0012

Series: Initiative for Policy Dialogue

The Political Economy of the SDRM

Show Summary Details

Preview

This chapter examines the IMF effort to create the sovereign debt‐restructuring mechanism (SDRM) and the forces that lined up in favor of and against the proposal. It emphasizes that different stakeholders had rather different ideas of proposals for reforming the workouts from defaults on private creditors. it saw the mainly European creditor governments that supported developing the SDRM as wishing to give debtor countries greater legal protection against their creditors during debt restructuring, thereby reducing the demand for IMF bailout packages (although it finds little connection between the short‐term financial crisis factors that lead to bailouts and the later process for restructuring sovereign bonds). Conversely, emerging economy governments that issue bonds internationally worried that they would in fact lose access to IMF funding in the event of need and they worried what signal the market might read from the creation of a bankruptcy regime, possibly raising the perceived riskiness and thus interest cost of their obligations.

Keywords: political economy; sovereign debt reform mechanism; IMF; bankruptcy

Chapter.  14483 words. 

Subjects: Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.