Chapter

How CACs Became Boilerplate

Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati

in Overcoming Developing Country Debt Crises

Published in print February 2010 | ISBN: 9780199578788
Published online May 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191723049 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199578788.003.0013

Series: Initiative for Policy Dialogue

How CACs Became Boilerplate

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The authors found this intriguing, as it is doubtful that senior political figures in the major economic powers knew what legal boilerplate was, let alone would advocate for particular clauses. There was policy content in the advocacy, however, over whether ‘market‐based’ (i.e. contractual) changes would suffice to provide for orderly restructuring of sovereign bonds of developing countries in financial crisis. In fact, the CACs in question have yet to face a major test under fire. The authors found little indication of belief among the more than 100 intimately involved people in the CAC debate that they interviewed that the clauses would be important determinants of restructuring outcomes.

Keywords: collective action clauses; sovereign debt; reform mechanisms; IFM; G7; Brady Plan

Chapter.  19534 words. 

Subjects: Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics

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