Chapter

Intellections and Volitions in Ockham’s Nominalism

Claude Panaccio

in Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy

Published in print October 2012 | ISBN: 9780199579914
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191745959 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579914.003.0005
Intellections and Volitions in Ockham’s Nominalism

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The goal of this paper is to explain how the fourteenth-century philosopher William of Ockham conceived of the relations between the intellect and the will within the framework of his nominalist ontology. It is shown first how, in Ockham's view, the terms ‘intellect’ and ‘will’ refer to the very same thing, without being synonymous: while coreferential, the two terms connote different mental acts. The paper then spells out in detail the various connections that hold according to Ockham between intellectual acts and volitional acts, including intellectual emotions.

Keywords: connotative terms; intellect; intellection; nominalism; right reason; weakness of will; volition; will; William of Ockham

Chapter.  10045 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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