Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content

Uriah Kriegel

in Cognitive Phenomenology

Published in print December 2011 | ISBN: 9780199579938
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191731112 | DOI:
Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content

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Since the seventies, it has been customary to assume that intentionality is independent of consciousness. Recently, a number of philosophers have rejected this assumption, claiming that intentionality is closely tied to consciousness, inasmuch as non‐conscious intentionality in some sense depends upon conscious intentionality. Within this alternative framework, the question arises of how to account for unconscious intentionality, and different authors have offered different accounts. A central goal of this paper is to argue for a broadly Dennettian, interpretivist account of unconscious intentionality. A second goal is to argue that an upshot of interpretivism is that all unconscious intentionality is ultimately grounded in a specific kind of cognitive phenomenology, namely, the phenomenology of conscious interpretive acts.

Keywords: cognitive phenomenology; consciousness; intentionality; interpretivism; intentional stance

Chapter.  11976 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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