On the Phenomenology of Thought

Joseph Levine

in Cognitive Phenomenology

Published in print December 2011 | ISBN: 9780199579938
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191731112 | DOI:
On the Phenomenology of Thought

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This paper distinguishes weaker and stronger versions of CP (the Cognitive Phenomenology Hypothesis) along two dimensions: first, whether cognition contributes to phenomenal character only by way of modifying sensory phenomenal character, or it creates a purely non‐sensory kind of phenomenal character (“impure CP” vs. “pure CP,” respectively); second, whether cognitive phenomenal character has what I call “opaque content” or “transparent content” (“CPOC” vs. “CPTC,” respectively). The first member of each distinction is the weaker one. The paper then explores the arguments for there being any sort of cognitive phenomenology to see which of these versions are supported. The paper tentatively concludes that the weakest version, impure CPOC, is the most one can get out of these arguments.

Keywords: consciousness; phenomenal character; subjectivity; self‐knowledge; phenomenology

Chapter.  9871 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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