The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology<sup>1</sup>

Jesse J. Prinz

in Cognitive Phenomenology

Published in print December 2011 | ISBN: 9780199579938
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191731112 | DOI:
The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology1

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This paper argues that all cognitive phenomenology can be reduced to sensory phenomenology, including mental imagery and inner speech. The position is called restrictivism and it contrasts with expansionism, which asserts that there is proprietary phenomenology associated with cognition. Four phenomena that seem to demand expansion are considered and rejected: conceptual phenomenology, imageless thoughts, languageless thoughts, and attitude differentiation. The paper also sketches a case against expansionism, and concludes that restrictivism is both immune to standard objections and more plausible than expansionism overall.

Keywords: imagery; inner speech; propositional attitudes; emotion; motor phenomenology; expansionism; restrictivism

Chapter.  11271 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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