Chapter

The Arguments from Determinism

Thomas Holden

in Spectres of False Divinity

Published in print March 2010 | ISBN: 9780199579945
Published online May 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191722776 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579945.003.0007
The Arguments from Determinism

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This chapter documents and examines Hume's account of the implications of his deterministic ‘doctrine of necessity’ for the moral status of any first cause or designer. There are two main conclusions. First, Hume embraces the argument from determinism against duties to God. According to this argument, if there is some such original cause or designer, then it has in effect foreordained every human action, and so cannot reasonably be aggrieved at or offended by those actions. For Hume, the deity cannot then enter into the sort of moralized relations that presuppose the possibility of legitimate grievance or moral offense, and we cannot owe duties to God. Second, it is also argued that, contrary to a popular line of interpretation, Hume's determinism does not commit him to the conclusion that the first cause is the author of our sins in any sense that need compromise the deity's moral character.

Keywords: deity; determinism; doctrine of necessity; duties; first cause; God; Hume; moral offense; necessity; sin

Chapter.  8871 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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