Chapter

The Bishop, the Valet, the Wife, and the Ass: What Difference Does it Make if Something is Mine?

Maximilian de Gaynesford

in Partiality and Impartiality

Published in print October 2010 | ISBN: 9780199579952
Published online January 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191595233 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579952.003.0005
The Bishop, the Valet, the Wife, and the Ass: What Difference Does it Make if Something is Mine?

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Debate about the relative weight to be given partial and impartial considerations in practical reasoning is stultified by a marked tendency to polarization in current views about the role played by the first person. This polarization depends on tacit assumptions that are strikingly contemporary, which render practical reasoning incomprehensible, and which the partialist and impartialist both can and should reject. Impartialists need not deny significance to the first person; they would be wrong to do so; even Godwin did not. Partialists need not regard the significance of the first person as dominating; they would be equally wrong to do so.

Keywords: first person; partiality; impartiality; Godwin; Williams

Chapter.  6667 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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