Chapter

Permissible Partiality, Projects, and Plural Agency*

Sarah Stroud

in Partiality and Impartiality

Published in print October 2010 | ISBN: 9780199579952
Published online January 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191595233 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579952.003.0007
Permissible Partiality, Projects, and Plural Agency*

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This chapter considers whether our moral entitlement to manifest certain kinds of partiality stems from a morally basic permission to be partial, or whether it can be accounted for in some other way. In particular, it explores the possibility of justifying partial conduct via a general moral prerogative to pursue our own projects. On this approach, in contexts of plural agency, where two or more people together pursue a joint project, we would have permission to favour our co-agents — but only in ways that relate to our joint project. While this approach might limit the scope of morally permissible partiality, it seems more faithful to the concerns that animate the partiality debates than the alternative of claiming an unrestricted basic right to be partial to whomsoever we wish.

Keywords: projects; plural agency; partiality; permissions; agency

Chapter.  9129 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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