The Argument from the Moral Implications of Objectivity (or Lack Thereof )

David Enoch

in Taking Morality Seriously

Published in print July 2011 | ISBN: 9780199579969
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729010 | DOI:
The Argument from the Moral Implications of Objectivity (or Lack Thereof )

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This chapter presents a partly normative argument for metaethical objectivity, arguing that non-objectivist metaethical views (including expressivist ones) have highly implausible normative implications in cases of interpersonal disagreement and conflict. The chapter first present and defends a normative principle (‘Impartiality’) governing the resolution of certain interpersonal conflicts, and then proceeds to argue that this principle — together with a host of intuitively non-objectivist metaethical theories — entails unacceptable normative results. An appendix discusses the issue of metaethics' normative neutrality, suggests an interpretation of it (according to which metaethics is morally neutral if it conservatively extends morality), and argues that the argument in the main text shows that at least with neutrality thus understood, metaethics is not normatively neutral.

Keywords: objectivity; morality; disagreement; conflict; neutrality; conservative extension; Impartiality; subjectivism; expressivism; response-dependence

Chapter.  19315 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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