Chapter

Doing with Less

David Enoch

in Taking Morality Seriously

Published in print July 2011 | ISBN: 9780199579969
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729010 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579969.003.0005
Doing with Less

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This chapter critically discusses three families of attempts to give the metaethical or meta-normative realist pretty much all that she wants, without resorting to the metaphysical extravagance of Robust Realism. The first is an attempt at a kind of naturalism that accommodates (by reduction, with this word sufficiently broadly understood) normativity. Naturalism is rejected mostly by emphasizing the thought that normative truths and facts are just too different from natural ones to be a subset thereof. The second family of views discussed are a host of error-theories and fictionalist views. These are rejected mostly because they cannot accommodate the kind of objectivity argued for in Chapter 2. Lastly, a host of quietist thoughts — according to which, roughly, a fairly robustly realist view can be had with no heavy metaphysical commitments — are analyzed, distinguished, and rejected.

Keywords: naturalism; reduction; error theory; fictionalism; quietism; Scanlon

Chapter.  19833 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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