David Enoch

in Taking Morality Seriously

Published in print July 2011 | ISBN: 9780199579969
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729010 | DOI:

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This chapter is a discussion of some distinct but related metaphysical worries about Robust Realism. The first is the most general worry associated with Mackie's argument from queerness. But this argument — unless it can be seen as standing for some other worries discussed elsewhere in the book — can rather easily be dismissed. The two other objections start from the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative. One challenge about supervenience states that given such supervenience, and the identity of necessarily co-extensive properties, naturalism follows. Robust Realism avoids this objection by rejecting the identity of necessarily co-extensive properties, a rejection that is motivated by the discussion of indispensability and parsimony in Chapter 3. The second supervenience challenge requires an explanation for supervenience-without-reduction. A partial explanation of this kind — one that is consistent with Robust Realism — is provided, and the remaining bruteness and violation of Hume's Dictum is shown to be quite acceptable.

Keywords: Mackie; supervenience; Frank Jackson; Simon Blackburn; parsimony; reduction

Chapter.  9651 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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