Chapter

Epistemology

David Enoch

in Taking Morality Seriously

Published in print July 2011 | ISBN: 9780199579969
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729010 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579969.003.0007
Epistemology

Show Summary Details

Preview

A common objection to realism (robust or otherwise) is that realists owe us — very roughly speaking — an account of how it is that we can have epistemic access to the normative truths about which they are realists. This chapter first distinguishes between many different ways of understanding this epistemological challenge to Robust Realism, then focusing on the strongest version of the challenge, namely, the need to explain the correlation between our normative beliefs and the independent normative truths (or else accept that there is no such correlation, and that skepticism about the normative is the way to do). After the challenge is clearly stated, a way of coping it is suggested. The way to explain the correlation is by resorting to a (godless) pre-established-harmony kind of explanation, one that utilizes some plausible evolutionary speculations. In a final section there is a preliminary discussion of the somewhat related problem of accommodating semantic access.

Keywords: moral epistemology; Sharon Street; Paul Benacerraf; Hartry Field; skepticism; epistemic access; semantic access; pre-established harmony

Chapter.  18944 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.