Chapter

Law as Coordination

John Finnis

in Philosophy of Law

Published in print April 2011 | ISBN: 9780199580088
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580088.003.0004
Law as Coordination

Show Summary Details

Preview

This chapter responds to Joseph Raz's response to the discussion of law's moral authority, particularly to his claim that it begged the question (argued in a vicious circle). But it does so by surveying the structure of coordination problems in the broad sense employed also by Raz and others, in which the game-theoretical, narrow concept of Coordination Problems is only one variant among many others (such as, at the opposite extreme, Prisoners' Dilemma Problems). The differentiation draws, as in Natural Law and Natural Rights, on Edna Ullmann-Margalit. It allows the retention of the game-theoretical concept of salience, and shows that the ‘procedural’ features of the Rule of Law are integral to law's salience as a scheme for cooperation for common good.

Keywords: Raz; Coordination Problems; game theory; salience; Ullmann-Margalit; Rule of Law; moral authority of law

Chapter.  3603 words. 

Subjects: Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.