Chapter

Reason and Authority in <i>Law's Empire</i>

John Finnis

in Philosophy of Law

Published in print April 2011 | ISBN: 9780199580088
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580088.003.0013
Reason and Authority in Law's Empire

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This chapter offers a detailed assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of Dworkin's principal work in legal theory. His resolute adoption of the internal point of view is a great virtue. His transposition of his analysis into the frame of interpretation is less successful, and plagued with fundamental ambiguities about what interpretation is. His claims about the semantic sting are thoroughly inaccurate, certainly in relation to Hart and to the natural law tradition. His thesis about the one right answer in hard cases fails on its own terms. His theory of authority and legitimacy is very thinly developed.

Keywords: Dworkin; internal point of view; interpretation; semantic sting; one right answer; hard cases; Hart; authority

Chapter.  9090 words. 

Subjects: Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

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