Chapter

Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough

Barry Loewer

in Meaning, Mind, and Matter

Published in print March 2011 | ISBN: 9780199580781
Published online May 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191595264 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580781.003.0015
Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough

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Jaegwon Kim famously argues that no form of “non‐reductive physicalism,” including Davidson's anomalism monism, can provide an adequate account of mental causation. His argument depends on a principle he calls “exclusion” that says, in effect, that if an event has a sufficient physical causal explanation then it doesn't also have an “independent” psychological explanation. This chapter counters by arguing that the exclusion principle depends on a metaphysically loaded account of causation. The chapter develops the counterfactual account of causation discussed in earlier chapters to rebut Kim's argument.

Keywords: J. Kim; D. Davidson; non‐reductive physicalism; anomalism monism; causal explanation; exclusion principle; causation

Chapter.  10731 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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