Tyler Burge

in Origins of Objectivity

Published in print March 2010 | ISBN: 9780199581405
Published online May 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191723223 | DOI:

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This chapter discusses the philosophical background that underlies the author's rejection of Individual Representationalism — specifically anti-individualism. In general form, this standpoint is compatible with some types of Individual Representationalism. In the specific form that it takes through reflecting on perception, anti-individualism is incompatible with all types. Anti-individualism is a view about constitutive conditions for individuals to be in certain representational states. It is not specifically about conditions for objective representation. Many mental states whose constitutive conditions it is concerned with, however, do represent an objective (mind-independent or constitutively non-perspectival) subject matter objectively (veridically). By reflecting on anti-individualism in both general and specific forms, one better understands origins of objectivity. The chapter also sketches some general points about the science of perceptual psychology.

Keywords: individual representationalism; anti-individualism; perception; perceptual psychology

Chapter.  23698 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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