Chapter

The Dual Character of Concepts and the Discourse Theory of Law

Maeve Cooke

in Institutionalized Reason

Published in print February 2012 | ISBN: 9780199582068
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191739354 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582068.003.0012
The Dual Character of Concepts and the Discourse Theory of Law

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This chapter focuses on discourse theory. Some of the most persistent objections to discourse theory concern the connection it asserts between discourse and truth/practical correctness. A key question here is whether discourse theory can maintain a conception of validity in an absolute sense. It is argued that by virtue of his account of the dual character of concepts, Alexy is able to uphold such a conception, while avoiding a serious criticism that Albrecht Wellmer has raised against the discourse theories proposed by Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas. As a lead-in to the discussion of the relation between discourse and absolute validity, the chapter offers a reading of Alexy's views of legal philosophy and of the institutionalized practice of law. In addition to casting light on important aspects of Alexy's discourse theory, this serves to introduce Alexy's notion of absolute procedural validity, which is a key element in the discussion.

Keywords: discourse theory; Robert Alexy; absolute procedural validity; legal philosophy; law

Chapter.  9202 words. 

Subjects: Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

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