Chapter

Should concretists part with mereological models of the incarnation?

Thomas P. Flint

in The Metaphysics of the Incarnation

Published in print January 2011 | ISBN: 9780199583164
Published online May 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191725647 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583164.003.0004
Should concretists part with mereological models of the incarnation?

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Concretism is the claim that the incarnate Son of God assumed a concrete created individual that, had it existed on its own, would have qualified as a full human person. This chapter briefly mentions a few reasons for endorsing concretism and introduces two desiderata for a fully developed concretism. It then explains why mereological models of the incarnation are naturally alluring to one with concretist sympathies. The two most plausible mereological models (one suggested by Aquinas, the other by Scotus and, more recently, by Brian Leftow) are then discussed, along with the problems (philosophical and theological) that attend them. After noting two alternatives to mereological models that might be available to the concretist, along with their strengths and weaknesses, the chapter concludes by suggesting the position regarding concretism that is most worthy of support.

Keywords: concretism; incarnation; mereology; Aquinas; Scotus; Leftow

Chapter.  9728 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Religion

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