Chapter

Identity with a Difference: Comments on Macdonald and Macdonald

Peter Wyss

in Emergence in Mind

Published in print April 2010 | ISBN: 9780199583621
Published online May 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191723483 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583621.003.0011

Series: Mind Association Occasional Series

Identity with a Difference: Comments on Macdonald and Macdonald

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This chapter explores a striking similarity between the Macdonalds' property exemplification account and S. Alexander's ‘identity doctrine’. Both approaches relate the distinctiveness of emergent properties to their causal and individuative powers. It is then argued that this view of distinctiveness conflicts with the dependence of emergent properties, if the latter is explicated in terms of realization. Outlining four reservations about realization, it concludes that the Macdonalds' physicalism is incompatible with emergence after all.

Keywords: emergence; property exemplification account; realization; dependence; individuation; causal relevance; physicalism

Chapter.  4410 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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