Chapter

Can Any Sciences be Special? Comments on Papineau

Michael Esfeld

in Emergence in Mind

Published in print April 2010 | ISBN: 9780199583621
Published online May 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191723483 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583621.003.0013

Series: Mind Association Occasional Series

Can Any Sciences be Special? Comments on Papineau

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This chapter seeks to develop Papineau's argument further in the direction of a reductive but conservative physicalism that sets out to vindicate the scientific quality of the special sciences by linking them systematically to physics. Such a link can be established by constructing fine‐grained functional sub‐kinds in the vocabulary of the special sciences that are nomologically coextensive with physical kinds. A further advantage of this strategy is that the problem of the causal efficacy of objects insofar as they come under kinds of the special sciences does not arise.

Keywords: causation; functionalism; natural kinds; quantum mechanics; reductive physicalism; selection; special sciences; sub‐kinds

Chapter.  3126 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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