Chapter

Socrates’ Case for the Sufficiency Thesis

Daniel C. Russell

in Happiness for Humans

Published in print October 2012 | ISBN: 9780199583683
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191745713 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583683.003.0007
Socrates’ Case for the Sufficiency Thesis

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This chapter begins the examination of the Stoics’ thesis that virtuous activity is sufficient for happiness, starting with its origins in several of Plato’s Socratic dialogues. It argues that Socrates’ argument for the sufficiency of virtue for happiness is best understood as the Stoics understood it, viz. relying on a “formalized” conception of activity as the exercise of choice within circumstances from which the self is always distinct. Other interpretations of Socrates’ position are considered and rejected.

Keywords: activity; apology; Cicero; On Goals; Epictetus; Euthydemus; Gorgias; Terence Irwin; Plato; Naomi Reshotko; George Rudebusch; self; Socrates; virtuous activity

Chapter.  11890 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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