Chapter

The Stoics’ Case Against the Embodied Conception

Daniel C. Russell

in Happiness for Humans

Published in print October 2012 | ISBN: 9780199583683
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191745713 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583683.003.0012
The Stoics’ Case Against the Embodied Conception

Show Summary Details

Preview

This chapter examines the Stoics’ argument that the embodied conception of activity makes one perilously vulnerable to ethical degradation. First, it examines Cicero’s review of Stoic arguments that susceptibility to distress is incompatible with virtue. Second, it traces this position to the more basic Stoic view, developed by Epictetus, that taking vulnerable relationships and projects to be crucial to one’s happiness makes one susceptible to manipulation and compromises our ability to act in accordance with right reason. The theory of happiness developed in this book is therefore a compromise between the closeness we desire with others and the dangers that that closeness brings.

Keywords: autonomy; Cicero; discourses; sistress; emotion; Epictetus; freedom; grief; A Man in Full; vulnerability; Tom Wolfe

Chapter.  15027 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.