Chapter

The Costs to Criminal Theory of Supposing that Intentions are Irrelevant to Permissibility*

Douglas Husak

in The Philosophy of Criminal Law

Published in print March 2010 | ISBN: 9780199585038
Published online May 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191723476 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585038.003.0004
 							The Costs to Criminal Theory of Supposing that Intentions are Irrelevant to Permissibility*

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This chapter describes the costs that criminal theory would be forced to pay by adopting the view (currently fashionable among many moral philosophers) that the intentions of the agent are irrelevant to determinations of whether his actions are permissible (or criminal). Among other difficulties, the view that is challenged encounters enormous problems accounting for penal liability for attempted crimes.

Keywords: intentions; retributivism; punishment; double-effect; attempts; morality

Chapter.  12445 words. 

Subjects: Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

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