Chapter

Transcendental Arguments I

Anthony Brueckner

in Essays on Skepticism

Published in print August 2010 | ISBN: 9780199585861
Published online January 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191595332 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585861.003.0002
Transcendental Arguments I

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This chapter begins by considering the aforementioned Stroudian critique of transcendental arguments. Some doubts are raised about whether Stroud has succeeded in giving a fully general argument against the possibility of transcendental arguments. Then Peter Strawson's reconstruction of what he takes to be Kant's anti-sceptical reasoning in the Transcendental Deduction is considered, via the lense of Richard Rorty's reconstruction of Strawson's reconstruction of Kant. What emerges is a ‘conceptual presupposition’ strategy for addressing the sceptic. It is argued that this strategy falls prey to the Stroudian critique.

Keywords: Kant; Stroud; Peter Strawson; Richard Rorty; verificationism; phenomenalism

Chapter.  12294 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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