The Structure of the Skeptical Argument

Anthony Brueckner

in Essays on Skepticism

Published in print August 2010 | ISBN: 9780199585861
Published online January 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191595332 | DOI:
The Structure of the Skeptical Argument

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This chapter focuses on the question whether the standard closure-based sceptical argument requires the assumption of a second epistemic principle, an ‘underdetermination principle’, which could drive a sceptical argument that does not require closure. The question is raised: Is the underdetermination principle equivalent to closure?

Keywords: closure; underdetermination; justification; favouring; evidence

Chapter.  3935 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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