Chapter

Hempel, Explanation, Metaphysics

Jaegwon Kim

in Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind

Published in print October 2010 | ISBN: 9780199585878
Published online January 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191595349 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585878.003.0010
Hempel, Explanation, Metaphysics

Show Summary Details

Preview

“Hempel, Explanation, Metaphysics” argues that if Carl Hempel had been willing to make use of some of the metaphysical concepts that are now regarded as uncontroversial, such as the concept of an event, the concept of causation, and others, he could have formulated and defended his theory of explanation more simply and effectively. This claim is illustrated with various purported counterexamples that dogged Hempel's DN model of explanation. However, Hempel's positivist commitments stood in the way. This essay includes a short argument defending Hempel's view that explanations are logical derivations or arguments.

Keywords: explanation; Raven Paradox; event; causation; metaphysics; positivism; explanation as deduction

Chapter.  7673 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.