Chapter

Anti‐Luck Virtue Epistemology

Duncan Pritchard

in The Nature and Value of Knowledge

Published in print May 2010 | ISBN: 9780199586264
Published online September 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191723360 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.003.0003
Anti‐Luck Virtue Epistemology

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This chapter canvasses two master intuitions about knowledge: the ability intuition and the anti-luck intuition. It argues that a robust anti-luck epistemology, which takes the anti-luck intuition as central, cannot accommodate the ability intuition, and that a robust virtue epistemology which takes the ability intuition as central cannot accommodate the anti-luck intuition. It is suggested that the proper moral to be extracted from this impasse is that we need an anti-luck virtue epistemology — a theory of knowledge which incorporates two separate epistemic conditions designed to accommodate each of the two master intuitions about knowledge. Such a view can accommodate a range of key examples of interest to epistemologists. A genealogical diagnosis of the structure of knowledge is offered which supports this proposal. Anti-luck virtue epistemology can adequately respond to those versions of the value problem for knowledge which do not trade on the intuition that knowledge is finally valuable.

Keywords: anti-luck epistemology; anti-luck virtue epistemology; cognitive ability; epistemic luck; epistemic value; knowledge; virtue epistemology

Chapter.  8482 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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