Chapter

Normative Logic and Psychology: Peirce’s Rejection of Psychologism

Christopher Hookway

in The Pragmatic Maxim

Published in print November 2012 | ISBN: 9780199588381
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191745089 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588381.003.0006
Normative Logic and Psychology: Peirce’s Rejection of Psychologism

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Peirce often claimed that the conclusion of an abductive inference is often or usually in the interrogative mood. ‘Abduction’ is used by some scholars to refer to inference to the best explanation. Peirce’s usage treats inference to the best explanation as a complex process which involves induction and deduction as well as abduction. Abduction itself is a procedure for identifying hypotheses that are worthy of further investigation. Peirce often argues that the conclusion of an abductive inference is, thus, an interrogative, identifying the question that we should investigate. This chapter explains why Peirce held this view, putting it in the context of his views about the method of science. The chapter also explains how it is that, in some circumstances, abductive inferences lead to certain belief rather than just identifying hypotheses for further investigation

Keywords: abduction; interrogatives; induction; inference to the best explanation; uncontrollable abductions; questions

Chapter.  16985 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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