Chapter

Defending Luck Egalitarianism

Kok-Chor Tan

in Justice, Institutions, and Luck

Published in print February 2012 | ISBN: 9780199588855
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191738586 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588855.003.0005
Defending Luck Egalitarianism

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This chapter responds to some influential objections raised by proponents of democratic equality (e.g. Anderson, Scheffler, Freeman) against luck egalitarianism. I argue that these objections are deflected when the domain, site, and purpose of luck egalitarianism are understood in the way I have proposed. While various aspects of luck egalitarianism are no doubt in need of further refinement and development (as is the case with other competing conceptions of equality), the main conclusion of this chapter is that the standard worries that luck egalitarianism is so implausible as not even to get off the ground as a justification of equality are unfounded. Luck egalitarianism as an account of the grounds of equality is both attractive and plausible, and therefore deserving of continuing philosophical attention and defense.

Keywords: equality; distributive justice; luck egalitarianism; democratic equality; moral luck; humanitarian assistance; equality as a social ideal; social cooperation; Elizabeth Anderson; Samuel Scheffler; Samuel Freeman

Chapter.  12663 words. 

Subjects: Social and Political Philosophy

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