Chapter

Kripke's Wittgenstein

Paul Horwich

in Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy

Published in print December 2012 | ISBN: 9780199588879
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191744716 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588879.003.0005
Kripke's Wittgenstein

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Inspired by the Philosophical Investigations, Saul Kripke has devised a skeptical line of reasoning about meaning that differs substantially from the purely therapeutic preoccupation that was imputed to Wittgenstein in Chapter 4. The present chapter examines that alternative interpretation. The focus here is on the philosophical plausibility of its central arguments and contentions. Objections are made to its implicit inflationism about reference and truth, to its failure to acknowledge a naturalistically respectable conception of ‘ideal law’, and to its confusions over ‘guidance’ and ‘normativity’. But this critical appraisal — since it emerges from the Wittgensteinian perspective described in Chapter 4 — also reveals the extent to which Kripke's Wittgenstein diverges from Wittgenstein himself.

Keywords: Kripke; skepticism; meaning; truth; rule-following; inflationism; ideal law

Chapter.  9100 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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