Chapter

Open and Shut? Democratic Opening <i>vs</i> Regulatory Closure After 2008

Ewald Engelen, Ismail Ertürk, Julie Froud, Sukhdev Johal, Adam Leaver, Michael Moran, Adriana Nilsson and Karel Williams

in After the Great Complacence

Published in print September 2011 | ISBN: 9780199589081
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191731150 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589081.003.0007
Open and Shut? Democratic Opening vs Regulatory Closure After 2008

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This chapter addresses the question of how the impetus to reform in response to the banking crisis was lost. It argues that democratic reform failed because competing technocratic and political elite groups could not agree on what was to be done or how reform was to be turned into a politically actionable story for the public at large. At the same time, financial elites remained remarkably resilient and politically effective in defending the status quo and frustrating reform. While reform has so far been disappointing, the chapter also explores how the political processes in the United Kingdom and the United States that delivered non-reform were deeply unsettling. The crisis was a moment of danger (and opportunity) for all elite groups because it unsettled their established assumptions.

Keywords: banking crisis; regulatory reform; failure of reform; elite opportunity; democratic reform; UK political elites

Chapter.  13198 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Financial Institutions and Services

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