Chapter

The human embryo in vitro: person, chattel, or dolphin?

John Keown

in The Law and Ethics of Medicine

Published in print May 2012 | ISBN: 9780199589555
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191741036 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589555.003.0008
The human embryo in vitro: person, chattel, or dolphin?

Show Summary Details

Preview

This chapter considers the legal status of the human embryo in vitro. It begins by considering the legal categories available and concludes that there are two: person or chattel. It then considers the force of an analysis classifying the embryo as a person and the weaknesses of some contrary analyses classifying the embryo as property or as akin to property. It analyses two leading cases, the US case of Davis v Davis and the English case of Evans v Amicus Healthcare, both of which effectively adopted a property classification. It criticises the judgments for failing adequately to address the ontological status of the embryo. It also criticises the judgments for basing themselves on the current criminal law relating to abortion and the civil law relating to negligently inflicted pre-birth injury, instead of on the criminal law’s historical purpose of protecting human life from its beginning.

Keywords: embryo in vitro; legal status; person; chattel; Davis v Davis; Evans v Amicus Healthcare

Chapter.  16421 words. 

Subjects: Medical and Healthcare Law

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.