Chapter

Trust and the Uptake of Testimony

Paul Faulkner

in Knowledge on Trust

Published in print May 2011 | ISBN: 9780199589784
Published online May 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191725517 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589784.003.0005
Trust and the Uptake of Testimony

Show Summary Details

Preview

This chapter argues that the non-reductive theory of testimony suffers two failings. First, the idea that we have an entitlement to believe testimony gets things wrong descriptively. Either it wrongly takes gullibly formed beliefs to be warranted, or it wrongly takes beliefs formed on trust to be unwarranted. Second, the idea that we have an entitlement to believe testimony gets things wrong normatively. Rather, testimonial uptake must be reasonable for an audience. Existing non-reductive theories misconceive what motivates this requirement, taking it to be imposed by an argument from testimonial error when it is motivated by the problem of cooperation. And the responses that Tyler Burge and John McDowell give to the argument from error do not allow a response to this problem.

Keywords: testimony; epistemology; knowledge; warrant; non-reductive theory; entitlement; gullibility; cooperation; trust; Tyler Burge; John McDowell

Chapter.  9152 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.