Chapter

Eternity and Personality

Paul Helm

in Eternal God

Second edition

Published in print December 2010 | ISBN: 9780199590391
Published online January 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191595516 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590391.003.0004
Eternity and Personality

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It is alleged that a timeless being could not act, or intend, or remember, and so could not be a person. R, C. Coburn, Richard Swinburne, and David Hume are cited. But the concept of a person can be variously construed. Divine timelessness may have analogues to action, life and memory. Acts may have beginnings and endings but they maybe brought about by a timeless agent with timeless intentions. The purposed actions have to be in time but their purposers need not be. Pike's argument that omniscience is sufficient for personhood is considered. To sustain the universe may be to decree that it be endure for a period.

Keywords: timeless being; person; analogues; omniscience; timeless decree

Chapter.  6264 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Religion

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